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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

A. L. 'VILLIAMS & SONS, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

ANTHON E. BRO,VN and
LUCILLE BRO,VN,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
10518

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, a Utah corporation, appeals from
the decision of the Honorable John F. Wahlquist,
District Judge, granting the respondents judgment
on their counterclaim against the appellant in the sum
of $2,000 because of the alleged interference by the
appellant with an easement of the respondent.
1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant A. L. \Villiams & Sons, a Utah
corporation, filed suit against the defendants alleging
that the defendants breached a lease whereby the defendants leased certain property in a shopping center
in Roy, Utah from the appellant. The appellant sought
damages for breach of the lease. The respondents
answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim alleg·
ing that the appellant constructed buildings on a right
of way of the respondents. Thereafter an amended
answer and counterclaim was filed by the respondents ·
seeking removal of the buildings from the right of way
and actual damages in the sum of $7 ,882 and $5,000
punitive damages. The matter was tried before the •
Honorable John F. Wahlquist, District Judge, sitting 1
without jury, on September 28, 1965. The court con·
eluded that the appellant should recover from the
respondents, based upon the appellant's claim of breach
of the lease. The court, however, awarded judgment
to the respondents on their counterclaim in the amount
of $3,000 which when offset against the judgment
rendered in favor of the appellant resulted in a final
judgment being entered in favor of the respondents
and against the appellant in the sum of $2,000.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant submits that the judgment in favor
of the respondents should be reversed and that the lower
court should be directed to enter judgment in favor
2

of the appellant on its lease claim and dismiss the
judgment for the respondents based on their counterclaim.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant filed complaint June 24th, 1964,
against the respondents alleging that on June 1st,
1962, a lease was entered into between the parties for
certain space at a shopping center in Roy, Utah. The
lease was to run until July 1st, 1964 ( R-1) . It was
further alleged that the respondents vacated the premises when there were eight months due on the term
of the lease and that as a consequence, appellant was
entitled to damages for the breach of the lease. An
answer and counterclaim were filed (R-3). The pertinent part of the pleadings so far as this appeal is
concerned is the counterclaim of the respondents. No
cross-appeal has been taken from the decision of the
trial court awarding the appellant judgment against
the respondents on the claim of breach of the lease.
The counterclaim alleged that the respondents
were owners of a right of way for the perpetual use
in common with others of certain property near the
shopping center, which right of way included "service
drives, sidewalks and parking areas now or hereinafter
constructed" on the described property (R-3, p. 2).
The respondents claimed $7,882 actual damages because of the construction of buildings by appellant upon
the claimed right of way (R-10).
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At the time of trial, the deposition of Anthony
E. Brown was received and published. :Mr. Brown
indicated that he owned certain ground in a shopping
center in Roy, Utah which is the subject of the controversy between the parties (DT-9) . (1) He indicated
that he purchased the property in 1959 from Mr. Norman Thompson (DT-9). It further appeared that the
appellant had erected a building on the east end of
the shopping center on the parking right of way claimed
by the respondents (DT-10). It appeared that Mr.
Brown was aware of the construction, and at one time
had caused his attorney to write a letter in opposition
to the construction (DT-11). The letter was received
into evidence as defendants' Exhibit 5. Further, the
letter indicates that A. L. Williams & Sons was apparently contemplating the construction of a dry
cleaning unit in the Roy Shopping Center, and it was
claimed by the respondents, through counsel, that the
construction of the dry cleaning establishment would
interfere with the tenants of the respondents who had
leased respondents' property in the shopping center
for a dry cleaning establishment and launderette. The
letter also pointed out to the appellant that Mr. Brown
claimed a right of way in the shopping center area
where the construction was contemplated for the use
of parking or similar services. However, it did not
affirmatively object to the construction on the property,
but merely indicated that it was Mr. Brown's position
(1) The transcript at trial is cited (T). The deposition of Mr.
Brown is cited (DT).
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1

1

that no structure should be erected in the area unless
he consented to it. The letter finally indicated that
rnunsel for the respondents was of the opinion that
the matter could be amicably worked out among the
parties (Defendants' Exhibit 5). The area where the
eonstruction occurred was at the east end of the Roy
Shopping Center in a space 92.8 feet in width (Defendants' Exhibit I; Plaintiff's Exhibit F; Defendants'
Exhibit 6). Prior to the construction, there was a
Standard Service Station on the northeast end of the
shopping center and the space of 92.8 feet between
the service station and additional shopping center buildings. The effect of the construction was to completely
close the front of the shopping center area as is indicated in defendants' Exhibit 6. It also effected a 30
foot driveway in the rear of the buildings by preventing exit through the 92.8 foot space, but left a 16 foot
easement leading onto 1900 West Street from the 30
foot drive in the rear of the shopping center (Defendants' Exhibit I).
From appellants' Exhibit C, it appeared that the
Roy Shopping Center, a corporation, issued a warranty deed to the respondents covering their property
"together with a right of way in the grantees, their
heirs, administrators, executors, successors, assigns and
tenants and their or any of their customers, employees
and visitors to the perpetual use in common with others
entitled to the similar use of the streets, service drives,
sidewalks and parking areas now or hereinafter constructed or set apart for any such use within the area
5

described * * *" The conveyance of the right of way
was not made by the appellant but by the predecessors
in interest of the appellant. The warranty deed was
given in exchange for the transfer of property by the
respondents to the predecessors in interest of the appellant for the purposes of constructing and developing
the shopping center ( T-40) . As a result of the conveyances, the shopping center was constructed and
the appellant became the holder of the interest previously held by the Roy Shopping Center, Inc. In the
deposition of Anthony Brown, he indicated that he
was aware of the construction on the right of way but
took no other action to interfere with the construction
other than the letter sent by counsel (Defendants'
Exhibit 5, DT-11-13). He did indicate, however, that
at one time he had verbally protested the construction
to a manager of the appellant's center, Mr. "\Vade,

(DT-11).

Mr. Brown indicated in his deposition that he had
always been able to rent to customers and tenants the
space he held in the premises and that the premises
were rented at the time of his deposition (DT-18-20).
At the time of trial, Mr. Anthon E. Brown testified that he had operated a small grocery store on the
shopping center land prior to the development of the
center ( T-39). Mr. Brown indicated that after the
Shopping Center was constructed, he leased the property constituting his portion of the area and that at
present he has three tenants (T-41). He indicated
6

that his major tenant was Bee-Gee's, which occupied
approximately 5/6 of the total area of his portion of
the Shopping Center ( T-42). In front of the immediate shopping center area there is blacktopping, parking stalls and lighting (See Defendants' Exhibit 6).
This parking area is to the south or front of the buildings constituting the Shopping Center and on the
west of the buildings. Prior to the construction of
the building by appellant, now occupied by Ford Finance, the area of the easement of the respondents
was an area available for parking. There was blacktopping and parking stalls in the 92.8 foot area constituting the parking easement of the respondents
( T-44). The buildings of Mr. Brown were approximately 100 feet away from the 92.8 foot area constituting his parking easement (T-44). The building
encroaching upon the easement was constructed in
1963 (T-44). No objection other than the letter sent
over a year prior to the time of construction and the
verbal opposition indicated to Mr. Wade prior to construction was ever taken by the respondents to prevent
the construction of the building ( T-45-47) .
Mr. Brown testified that there has been a constant
increase in business and auto traffic at the Shopping
Center ( T-48). He further indicated that the construction of the building shut off circulation of the
traffic in the area around the buildings which had previously circulated by virtue of the 30 foot space to
the rear of the buildings. He indicated that this decreased the parking available to the tenants ( T -51 ) .
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It appeared that at the time the agreement was entered
into between appellant's predecessors and Mr. Brown
for the construction and operation of the Shopping
Center, the property of Mr. Brown was listed in the
contract for valuation purposes at $110,000. Mr. Brown
admitted that there was a barricade up around the
property where the building was constructed for approximately three months before construction actually
occurred ( T-65) . The building on the right of way
was completed in the fall of 1963 ( T-72) .

Mr. Edmond D. Cook, a real estate appraiser and
consultant, testified that he valued the property of
Mr. Brown at $91,128 prior to the construction of the
building on the right of way and that after he appraised
the property at $83,857, making a difference of $7,271
( T-82). He indicated that he was not aware that the
property had been previously valued at the time of
the agreement to construct the Shopping Center at
$110,000 (T-84). He made no study as to the number
of cars in the area (T-92) and limited his appraisal
on the effect of parking to parking stalls within 300
feet of Mr. Brown's property (T-95).
Mr. Glen H. Beck, a co-owner of Bee-Gee Ap·
parel, a tenant in the property of the respondents,
testified that he had no complaints as to the availability
of parking and felt that additional buildings would
generally strengthen the drawing power of the Center
(T-100) .
.Mr. Lester H. ~Tade, a shopping center developer
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and former manager for appellant, indicated that he
received no complaints from the respondents during
the time that the barricade was around the property
upon which the building was constructed. He stated
that the construction of the building had greatly improved access on the 30 foot area to the rear of the
Shopping Center buildings by avoiding illegal parking
problems that had been in existence in the past (Tlll). Mr. Wade indicated that a 2.75 to 1 parking
space to lease space ratio was desirable for a shopping
center which would, in comparison to the area owned
by Mr. Brown, be adequate (T-112). Mr. Wade, an
experienced shopping center developer, was of the
opinion that the value of the Brown property had not
depreciated over the years, but had in fact increased
m value by approximately $10,000 (T-112).
Mr. Don P. Williams, an officer of the appellant
corporation, indicated that there was no inadequacy
of parking in the shopping center area and that the
only time he had seen any parking difficulties was
during a special Christmas promotion when a large
part of the shopping center parking area had to be
roped off to allow a Santa Claus to come in on a helicopter (T-125).
Subsequent to the presentation of the evidence,
the court indicated that it would be inequitable to compel removal of the building but found that there had
been an intentional and deliberate effort on the part
of the appellant to take advantage of the respondents
9

and awarded $3,000 as the depreciation to the total
property for the "intentional depriving" of the respondents of the west end of the parking area. No
evidence of any kind was offered by either party to
indicate that there had been a depreciation of the prop·
erty in a value of $3,000. No witness appraised the
loss of the easement at $3,000 or even anywhere near
that figure.
Based upon the above facts, it is submitted that
this court should reverse.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN A':VARD·
ING THE RESPONDENTS $3,000 FOR DAMAGE TO THEIR PROPERTY BY VIRTUE OF
THE CONSTRUCTION OF A BUILDING UPON A RIGHT OF WAY AT THE ROY SHOP·
PING CENTER SINCE (A) RESPONDENTS
WERE GUILTY OF LACHES, (B) THE EVI·
DENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW ANY
ACTUAL DAMAGE TO THE RESPOND·
ENTS.
A
It is well settled that before a party can claim
damages or equitable relief because of an interference
with an easement, it must appear that he acted promptly
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in seeking some relief or protecting his right of way
position. Thus, in 28 C.J.S .. , Easements, § 108, it is
stated:
"A party seeking equitable relief against interference with ap., easement must be prompt in
doing so. Any long delay not satisfactorily explained nor accounted for will bar his rights to
such relief * * * "
It is recognized that mere delay in and of itself
is not necesarily the essential element for the application of the doctrine of laches. Jones Mining Co. v.
Cardiff Mining & Milling Co., 56 Utah 449, 191 P.
426 ( 1920) ; Pierce v. King County, 62 Wash. 2d 324,
382 P.2d 628 (1963). Rather it is the prejudice which
arises from the apparent acquiescence of a party in the
conduct of another party.

Thus in Lehi Irr. Co. v. Moyle, 4 Utah 327, 9 P.
867 ( 1886), it was held that a party could not stand
by and watch settlers use land and increase the capacity
of an irrigation ditch and thereafter deny the power
of the persons to use the ditch.

In Mary Jane Stevens v. First National Building
Co., 89 Utah 456, 57 P.2d 1099 (1936), this Court
indicated that a party could not stand by and watch a
change take place and thereafter claim a remedy for
an injury allegedly sustained as the result of the action.
In Ruthrau,ff v. Silver King Western Mining &
1llilling Co., 95 Utah 279, 80 P.2d 388 (1938), the
11

Court acknowledged that equity would not aid stale
demands nor act without showing of conscience, good
faith and reasonable diligence. Certainly, under the
facts and situation presented in the instant case, the
doctrine of laches should be available to the appellant
as a defense to any claim on the part of the respondents
for damages arising out of the construction of the
building on their right of way in the Roy Shopping
Center.
The facts in this case disclose that a conversation
was apparently had with the respondent Anthon E.
Brown relating to the construction of a building on
the right of way. Mr. Brown merely protested the
proposed construction through a letter from his attor·
ney (Defendants' Exhibit 5) in November of 1961.
The principal basis upon which the construction was
opposed was the contention that the building to be
constructed would compete with the building which the
respondents were presently leasing. Thereafter, no
further protestations or efforts to manifest objection
to the construction of the proposed right of way were
taken. Construction was not completed until fall of
1963. Further, prior to the time construction was ac·
tually commenced in 1963, the area was barricaded
and set apart for construction. The respondents had
actual knowledge of the construction and the intention
of the appellant to undertake construction. They were
aware of the fact that the parking easement would
no longer be available for their patrons since it was
not available during the full time of construction.
12

\Vith all this knowledge and with the fact that the
construction to be made was known to the respondents,
they stood by and took no action. Construction was
completed, the building rented, the Shopping Center
improved and still no action was taken. Only when
the appellant brought suit against the respondents
for breach of a lease did the respondents make any
claim for damages arising out of the alleged encroachment on their right of way. In the meantime, the
appellant had been allowed to go forward with construction, the use of the building, the development of
the Shopping Center, all under the apparent impression that the respondents had acquiesced in the construction period.
The respondents' tenant testified that he was not
opposed to the construction because he felt that any
development of the Center would work to the benefit
of all concerned ( T-100) . Certainly, it is not equitable
nor proper to allow the respondents damages at this
late date where they stood by and watched the construction acquiesced in the apparent use of the building
and only when called to account for their own breach
of covenant did they offer any objection to the construction. Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. First National
Building Co., supra. Certainly under these circumstances, the doctrine of laches should bar the claim of
the respondents for damages. It is certainly inequitable
to allow a party to sit back and watch another party
act to his apparent prejudi~e and detriment and in so
doing mislead the party into a belief that the action

13

he is taking is proper and consented to and then thereafter at a later date be subjected to a suit for damages.
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the
respondents' judgment should have been denied on
the grounds of laches.

B
It is admitted that the record is clear that the
respondents had a right of way in the property adjacent
to the east end of the Roy Shopping Center. It is
further admitted that the appellant caused to be con·
structed upon that right of way a building. It is sub·
mitted, however, that the trial court erred in finding
that the respondents had been damaged in the sum of
$3,000 by the construction of the building. No testimony was offered which would fix the respondents'
damages at $3,000. .M:r. Lester 'V' ade, a shopping
center developer, testified that the construction of the
new building did solve certain parking problems that
had existed with reference to a 30 foot strip of right
of way to the rear of the buildings and indicated that
the property of the respondents had increased in value
as a result of the development of the shopping center
by approximately $10,000 over what the property was
at the time they received it. The co-owner of the largest
tenant of the respondents testified that in his opinion
there was no damage from the constructin because he
was of the opinion that the more commercial development that occurred at the Shopping Center, the more
benefit it would work to the Center as a whole ( T-100).
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.l\fr. Anthon Brown's testimony was to the effect that
the only impact from the construction of the building
was the loss of parking space. However, the parking
otherwise appeared to be adequate except on one
occasion during Christmas time when a portion of the
parking center was roped off for a special Christmas
promotional event. There was no direct proof of any
kind offered that as a result of the construction, Mr.
Brown lost clients or that his tenants lost patrons or
that he lost any business income during the period.
Indeed, it appeared as a result of the total development
of the Shopping Center business was increased in the
area. The sole testimony as to any damage to the
respondents was based upon respondents' expert, Mr.
Cook, who testified that the respondents' property had
a lost market value because of the loss of the parking
right of way. However, this figure was substantially
unrelated to the figure that the court imposed judgment
upon.
It is recognized that in determining the damages
arising from an encroachment upon a right of way,
the usual rule is ~at the difference between the value
of the property just before the encroachment and its
value immediately after obstruction is completed is
to be the amount to which the party should be compensated. Ross v. American Security & Fidelity Co.,
123 Cal. App. 133, 10 P.2d 1019 (1932); McCormick,
Damages, 532 to 534 (1935). However, Rule 52 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the
court "find the facts specially and state separately its
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conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of an
appropriate judgment." In the instant case, it is
apparent that the trial court apparently misapplied
the standard required by Rule 52 since the findings do
not definitely state anything more than that the respondents are entitled to judgment against the appellant in the sum of $3,000 for depreciation to their
property. There is no finding of a market value prior
to the time the building was constructed on the respondents' right of way and a subsequent value. Further,
it is apparent from the Court's comments rendered at
the end of the trial that the judgment for $3,000 was
not based upon any actual loss to the respondents but ,
based upon what the court felt the respondents should
receive because of an intentional encroachment upon
their property. Thus, the damage issue was not properly
considered by the court.
It is submitted that the evidence is wholly insufficient to sustain the court's judgment. The rounded '
figure of $3,000 relates in no manner to the situation
that existed at the Roy Shopping Center at the time
of the construction of the building. The evidence, as
noted in the Statement of Facts and in the discussion,
shows that there was no actual loss to the respondents.
Consequently, since the court apparently misapplied
the standard of damages and further since there is no
evidence of record to in any way indicate that respond·
ents should be compensated in the sum of $3,000, it
is submitted that the decision of the trial court should

be reversed.
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CONCLUSION
It is submitted that this court should reverse the
decision of the trial court on two definite grounds.
First, it is submitted that the evidence clearly discloses
that the respondents stood by with full knowledge and
allowed the appellant to construct a building on their
right of way and did so under circumstances that worked
to the absolute prejudice of the appellant in face of
respondents' present claim. Further, it appears that
respondents completely acquiesced in the construction.
Only a minor protest was raised to any proposed
construction on the respondents' right of way and
then only because of a possible competing commercial
establishment would use the premises. Further the
protests were long before the time of construction
actually occurred and a substantial period of time
passed during which the appellant had barricaded the
property for the purposes of construction and during
which time the building was constructed without any
objection being raised by the respondents. Only when
the appellant brought suit for breach of lease covenant
to pay rent did the respondents for the first time urge
that the construction of the building had in any way
deprived him of a serious right. It is apparent, therefore, that the respondents have been guilty of laches
and that the judgment of the trial court should be
reversed.

Additionally, it appears that the trial court entered
an arbitrary figure for damages in favor of the respond17

ents. The figure was in no way related to the evidenct
offered by either party and cannot be rationalized upo11
the record. Further, it appears that the court in enter·
ing the judgment did so on an unsound legal basis. II
does not appear that the court actually considered the
before and after values to the repsondents' property
by virtue of the construction of the building. It i~
submitted that consequently this Court should reverse.
Respectfully submitted,
'VILLIAM J. CA YIAS, Esq.
Attorney for Appellant
405 Continental Bank Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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